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Abstract. This position paper presents a view on bridging the cognitive-
computational gap in the field of creativity, creative reasoning and prob-
lem solving. Starting from the levels of Cognition and Computation,
their potential bootstrap is discussed in relation to the concept of Cog-
nitive Social Machines. Five distinct aspects of bridging the cognitive-
computational gap in creative reasoning using cognitive social machines
are described and discussed in the creativity domain. These aspects refer
to (i) building systems and models which solve creative reasoning tasks;
(ii) computationally generated tools for a deeper understanding of cog-
nition; (iii) cognitively-inspired processes and knowledge representation
types; (iv) computational cognitive assistance, support and training and
(v) evaluative informativity metrics for cognitive social machines.
1 Introduction
In an experiment room, a human participant is given an image to look at, like the
one in Figure 1a, and asked what they can see. Presuming that she sees a snail,
she is asked whether she can also see an elephant (or the other way around).
Presuming she can see both, she is asked to try to switch between seeing one
or the other, while pressing a key for each successful switch she manages. The
response times will be measured to see how often she can do this switch. This
ability to re-encode features will be considered as a potential correlate for her
creativity levels.
Another participant may be prompted to focus on the image in Figure 1b
(stimulus provided by [46]). He will then be asked what this image represents.
He might provide answers like: a boardroom meeting, around a triangular table,
viewed from above; a pendant; three bottles of wine arranged around a triangle
of cheese on a shelf, etc. The number of his answers, the semantic domains they
span, their novelty as rated by other human participants or their originality
in comparison to answers from other participants, will be rated to provide a
creativity score for his answers.
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Fig. 1: Task examples from the study of creative cognition: (a) An elephant-snail
ambiguous figureand (b) Pattern meanings test example
Meanwhile, a computational system may analyse newspaper articles or online
news to construct their mood for the day. Subsequently, it may determine what
article to base a poem on, and what template to use for this poem. After writing
a poem, the system might computationally generate a framing for this poem,
like the following [7]:
It was generally a bad news day. I read an article in the Guardian entitled:
“Police investigate alleged race hate crime in Rochdale”. Apparently, “Stringer-
Prince, 17, has undergone surgery following the attack on Saturday in which
his skull, eye sockets and cheekbone were fractured” and “This was a completely
unprovoked and relentless attack that has left both victims shoked by their ordeal”.
I decided to focus on mood and lyricism, with an emphasis on syllables and
matching line lengths, with very occasional rhyming. I like how words like attack
and snake sound together. I wrote this poem.
Framing, thus the ability of the system to provide a commentary on the whole
process, would be evaluated as part of its creativity too, besides the poem.
These example reflect how the study of creativity is approached from the
cognitive versus computational realm. Both are supposed to measure creativity,
however, the agendas of the fields seem quite different. The differences do not
involve just tasks, but also of goals and methods. The fields have different identi-
ties, communities, and provide different interesting answers to different research
question contexts.
Given these differences, can a cognitive-computational bridge can be built?
Could such a bridge serve both the cognitive and computational communities?
This paper explores how cognitive social machines can be used for bridging the
cognitive-computational gap in the creativity domain.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The background of and differ-
ences between creative cognition and computational creativity are briefly sum-
marized, and a direction for bridging the gap is proposed in section 2. Sections 3
to 7 elaborate on this direction, by exploring five different aspects of a cognitive-
computational bootstrap using cognitive social machines. A summary discussion
of the approach’s key points is provided in section 8.
32 Background
Creativity, creative reasoning and creative problem solving are fields studied
across cognitive and computational disciplines with fairly different goals and
methods.
Human creativity is studied in cognitive psychology, with the purpose of
understanding the human creative process. Various creativity tests [26, 17, 20,
46, 25, 10] are deployed in evaluating creative performance, and for studying
hypotheses of how various conditions impact creativity and creative problem
solving.
The computational creativity community studies the question what does it
take for a machine to be creative. It builds computationally creative systems in
a wide variety of fields, including mathematics [24, 6, 4], music [39, 38, 44, 11],
art [3, 5], poetry and text composition [2, 15, 16, 7], architecture and design [42],
discovery of physical laws [21–23], magic trick making [48]; and video games [9].
Computational creativity also devises ways of evaluating computational creativ-
ity [47, 41, 40, 8, 45, 19]
In the middle ground of the creative cognition and computational creativity
fields, a few research projects (i) computationally study processes that are also
presupposed to play a role in the human cognition literature or (ii) computa-
tionally implement cognitive creativity theories. Some examples of such projects
have produced work on concept blending [13], analogy [14, 12], re-interpretation
and re-representation [27].
However, the authors believe that a stronger bootstrap between the cognitive
and computational sides of the creativity coin is possible if comparability of cog-
nitive and computing approaches is allowed for, and if the bootstrap is situated
in the domain of cognitive social machines. While previous work has aimed at
providing an initial point of reference for comparability [33], this work focuses
on situating such a bootstrap in the context of cognitive social machines. For
this, a working definition of cognitive social machines would be useful.
Social machines are defined as an environment comprising humans and tech-
nology interacting and producing outputs or action which would not be possi-
ble without both parties present.1. One of the primary characteristics of social
machines is that, having both human and computational participants, the line
between computational process and human process becomes blurred [43]. While
social machines are generally imagined around the web [18], this is just a tool
that makes the blending of human and computational work more likely.
Cognitive systems, on the other hand, are considered to be systems which
take inspiration, simulate or aim to replicate cognitive process, type of knowledge
and performance. Depending on one’s definition, these can range from cognitive
computational models which aim to predict and replicate human performace,
to systems inspired by a cognitive metaphor. Sometimes the term cognitive sys-
tems is also used in a way which is similar to the concept of human-computer
interaction (HCI), to describe the fact that particular systems interact well with
1 From https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_machine - retrieved 17.06.2017.
4their user, taking their user’s cognitive limitations into account, or taking into
account other cognitive phenomena – like user attention span.
We define cognitive social machines as sets of agents (humans and cognitive
systems), their processes (artificially or naturally cognitive) and data, which act
productively, informing and enabling eachother’s progress.
We believe cognitive and computational input and process can be boot-
strapped in cognitive social machines in such a way that both cognitive and
computational fields gain and advance from it. The main research question of
this paper is thus:
How can we bootstrap Cognition and Computation
to yield Cognitive Social Machines that are:
– (a) greater than the sum of their parts
– (b) which help improve both Cognition and Computation?
In this paper, this question will be deployed on the specific domain of cre-
ativity and creative problem solving. This research can be perceived as operating
on three levels:
– Cognitive level (Cog) - human reasoning and process as examined via cog-
nitive science tools
– Computational level (Comp) - artificial creative cognitive systems
– Coupling (∞) - cognitive social machines
The premise of what follows is that, if ways to reliably boost the computational
level via the cognitive level (Cog → Comp) and the cognitive level via the
computational level (Cog ← Comp) can be found, then a successful (Cog ∞
Comp) coupling level can be achieved.
In the following, five aspects of cognition, computation, and their cognitive
social machines coupling are described, in the context of the domain of creativity
and creative problem solving. These five aspects are:
- SYSTEMS – Systems and models which solve reasoning and creativity
tasks (section 3);
- TOOLS – Computationally generated tools for cognitive science (section
4);
- PROCESSES & KR – Cognitively-inspired processes and knowledge rep-
resentation types (section 5);
- ASSISTANCE – Computational cognitive assistance, support and training
(section 6) and
- METRICS – Evaluative informativity metrics of social machines (section
7).
3 Systems and models which solve reasoning and
creativity tasks (SYSTEMS)
The first aspect refers to computational work done to enable models and pro-
totype systems which are capable of creative problem solving feats, similar and
5comparable to humans. The process of realizing this aspect starts by choosing
a creative reasoning ability, then finding a creativity test which evaluates this
ability in humans. If such a test does not exist, a cognitive form of evaluation can
be built. The next steps are to search for a source of cognitive knowledge acqui-
sition, understand the types of cognitive process involved in the ability (or have
a good cognitively-inspired process hypothesis) and to attempt to implement
this ability in a computational solver. Afterwards, comparative evaluation can
be performed between the human and the computational solvers. This process
is shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 2: The process of the SYSTEMS aspect
Besides providing systems which are capable of solving tasks similar to the
tasks humans can solve, this aspect provides other benefits. Systems which are
implemented using cognitive processes, and which can be evaluated using compa-
rable tasks can (i) later be used by cognitive psychologists as tools to understand
and base more refined cognitive models on and (ii) can shed light on possibil-
ities of cognitive process which remain ambiguous while only theorized about,
without implementation.
For example, the Remote Associates Test [26] is a test used to measure cre-
ativity as a function the cognitive ability for association. The format of the test
is that three words are given to a participant, like Dew, Comb and Bee. The
participant is asked to come up with an answer that relates to all these three
words – a possible answer in this case is Honey. In an attempt to cognitively
solve this test computationally, [31] applied the principles of a cognitive frame-
work of creative problem solving [36, 28] and built a system (comRAT-C) which
solves the Remote Associates Test via a cognitively inspired process of asso-
ciation, divergence, and convergence on association overlap. Not only was the
computational solver correct in a great proportion of cases, but it brought to
light the issue that sometimes multiple answers might be plausible, something
which was not examined in human normative data, where only one correct an-
swer is given. The system also correlated with human data: the harder the query
for humans, the lower the probability metric provided by the system. Thus the
system can be used as a tool by cognitive psychologists to build more refined
6models starting from the initial coarse mechanism, which is now known to solve
the task in a way that correlates with human performance.
Cognitive Social Machine
The cognitive social machine at the SYSTEMS level can be described as follows.
Cognitive science and the human part of the social machine provide the cognitive
knowledge, cognitive process and cognitive evaluation. These are used to con-
struct and assess computational systems (Cog → Comp). The computational
systems in turn become models and tools, which can then be used to better
understand cognitive functioning (Comp→ Cog).
This approach can be generalized for a variety of tasks, as shown in Table 1.
For example, in the Wallach Kogan similarity test, human participants are asked
to provide ways in which various concepts, like fruits or objects are alike. A sys-
tem generating ad-hoc similarities on an equivalent dataset of objects as the ones
given to humans could be implemented and used for comparability. Various types
of object similarity algorithms exist which could be cognitively evaluated. More
such algorithms could be created with inspiration from the cognitive processes.
Systems which implement them could further be used by cognitive modelers, and
in tasks in which cognitive similarity between computational-human partners is
important (as will be shown in section 6).
4 Computationally generated tools for cognitive science
(TOOLS)
The second aspect refers to using cognitive and computational principles and
variants from the existing systems in the previous section, together with cognitive
data, in order to construct creativity and creative reasoning task generators.
Systems which allow for the generation of large datasets of creativity and creative
reasoning queries can be used to control for various parameters of such queries.
Sets of queries can then be designed to investigate specific empirical questions,
at a depth which is impossible without computational intervention in crafting
the stimuli. This process is shown in Figure 3.
Fig. 3: The process of the TOOLS aspect
7Table 1: Examples of SYSTEMS applications
Test Example task System/ability
Remote Associates Test COTTAGE SWISS CAKE comRAT – RAT solver [31]
The Alternative Uses test What can you use a brick for? Creative object replacement
system [32]
Similarity test Tell me all the ways in which Generating ad-hoc similarities
Wallach Kogan an apple and an orange are alike
Ambiguous figures Feature grouping system
Pattern Meanings Test Multiple memory search
Wallach Kogan based on features
Insight tests Practical object problem solver
8For example, here is an application of this aspect involving the Remote As-
sociates Test (RAT). Cognitive psychologists administering this test do not nor-
mally have control over variables like the frequency of each of the query words,
the frequency of the answer, the probability (based of frequency) that a partic-
ular answer would be found. There is a small normative dataset of compound
RAT queries often used in the literature, comprising 144 items [1]. The prin-
ciples of knowledge organization from the comRAT-C solver [31] were reverse
engineered to create a RAT-query generator (comRAT-G). With this generator,
a set of test items that spans the entirety of English language nouns was created
[35]. comRAT-G provided 17 million items which can be used by cognitive psy-
chologists in their work to understand the human creative process, by controlling
frequency and probability variables of the query words and the answer words.
This can allow for more complex experimental designs. From both a computa-
tional and cognitive perspective, this system opens the door to the exploration
of interesting questions, like for example what is a good Remote Associates Test
query, which requires creativity to answer?
Cognitive Social Machine
The cognitive social machine at the TOOLS level can be described as follows.
Humans help evaluate the quality of the computationally created test items
(Cog → Comp). The computationally created items are then used to deeper
understand the human creative reasoning process (Comp→ Cog).
Various tasks could be generated based on various types of cognitive data,
a few examples of which are shown in 2. For example, cognitive data on words
associates (rather than compound words) can be used to generate the functional
version of the Remote Associates Test. Data on cognitive visual similarity can
be used to generate some of the Wallach Kogan visual tests, etc. Some initial
work has been done in this direction [34, 37, 30].
Table 2: Examples of TOOLS applications
Test to generate Based on cognitive data Control for what variables
functional Remote Word associates, frequency, probability,
Associates Test cognitive ontologies word order, associate rank
Visual associates tests cognitive visual visual similarity,
associates, collocation strength of association
Wallach Kogan visual similarity No. of matches,
matches rank, orientation
Insight Tests object properties, no. of solving paths,
cognitive strategies no. of restructurings,
classical tests strength of functional fixedness
95 Cognitively-inspired processes and knowledge
representation types (PROCESSES & KR)
The third aspect – PROCESSES & Knowledge Representation – refers to (i)
learning from cognitive processes to get inspiration for computational processes
and (ii) learning from cognitive knowledge representation to support new types of
computational knowledge representation. The aim of this, as shown in Figure 4,
is to obtain cognitively friendly and innovative types of processes and knowledge
representation.
Fig. 4: The process of the PROCESSES & KR aspect
Cognitive Social Machine
The cognitive social machine at the level of PROCESSES & KR can be de-
scribed as follows. Humans provide inspiration of new processes and new types of
knowledge organization (Cog → Comp). Computational systems using cognitive
processes and knowledge representation may be capable of new tasks, of tackling
old tasks in new ways and may be more cognitively friendly (Comp→ Cog).
This aspect of the bootstrapping can lead to innovations of process and
knowledge representation, and to cognitive adaptations of already existing pro-
cesses and types of knowledge representation, as shown in Table 3. For example,
the cognitive process of restructuring and re-representation can inspire new types
of multiple pattern matching by framing sets of initial features from multiple
representation perspectives.
Systems which process, encode knowledge and communicate information in
cognitively inspired manner might be perceived as more cognitively friendly, and
thus be able to offer better support and assistance to natural cognitive agents.
6 Computational cognitive assistance, support and
training (ASSISTANCE)
Aspect four refers to using systems capable of tackling similar tasks as humans,
and using cognitive or cognitively inspired processed, types of knowledge orga-
nization in order to provide computational cognitive assistance. Systems under
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Table 3: Examples of PROCESSES applications
Process or KR Application
Creative association New forms of semantic networks
Object grounding & Linked data and new KR
properties comparison for adaptive robotics
ways of looking at data from
Restructuring and multiple perspectives;
re-representation multiple pattern matching and framing
with same set of initial features
this descriptions can be roughly split into supportive systems (S) and training
systems (T). Supportive systems would aim to assist their user in performing
creative and creative reasoning tasks, as a partner, co-creator, co-reasoner or
“muse”. Training systems would aim to help maintain or enhance creative and
creative reasoning abilities of their human partner. Input from the partner will
also be used to improve the assistive system.
Assistive systems could for example propose ideas for cooking new recipes,
reusing objects, furniture and room redesign, as shown in Table 4. However,
they could also be used in a deeper form of cognitive support, to provide the
kind of information which would lead to productive association of ideas and
restructuring. Training systems could be used to target and improve precise
creativity related skills, like the ability to exit functional fixedness.
Table 4: Examples of ASSISTANCE applications
Support (S) or training (T) for: Examples
(S) Creative problem solving cooking, reusing objects,
in household tasks furniture and room redesign
– functional fixedness exits
(T) Creative and – further reach in searches
inductive reasoning – multiple modalities and types of
intelligence engaged (user suited)
(S) Providing the right information for – promotes productive association of ideas
CR in cognitive tasks and search – leads to restructuring
(S) Recycling - recommenders and – object recycling in households
crowdsourced human data – support for recycling of wind turbines
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7 Evaluative informativity metrics of cognitive social
machines (METRICS)
The metrics level aims to evaluate the successful functioning of the cognitive
social machines set in place, and to optimize the distribution of processes, and
information flow. This level thus deals with questions as the following:
– Which part of processing and knowledge representation should each of the
cognitive and computational partners do?
– What are the information gains of various processing and knowledge rep-
resentation set-ups? (of various types of organizining and distributing the
parts of the machine)
– How does working together increase the generativity of both natural and
artificial cognitive systems?
– What measures protect working together? Information coherence? Informa-
tion structure?
While the first two questions pertain to organizing and optimizing the ma-
chine, the third question focuses on generativity as an evaluative metric – thus
the increase in productive capacity of both natural and artificial systems. This
productive capacity can be seen both as the ability to solve more problems, and
the ability to come up with new solutions – it is thus a creativity and creative
reasoning type of metric. Other cognitive metrics could also be devised to assess
various cognitive social machine set-ups.
The fourth question addresses measures which protect working together from
the perspective of cognitive adaptation of computational and cognitive parts to
each other. Thus systems which possess non-contradictory information, knowl-
edge organized in similar ways or similar ways of structuring information [29]
might be more productive than other systems, through being better adapted to
working together. Complementarity of such measures could also be more formally
defined, in ways in which it is usually defined for social interactions between nat-
ural agents. While this has some connections to the fields of HCI and adaptive
robotics. It focuses on cognitive informational measures which have as effect the
protection of cognitive resources and the protection of cognitive social work done
in partnership.
8 Conclusion and Future Work
A coherent view of bridging the cognitive-computational gap in the domain
of creativity and creative problem solving was proposed, using cognitive social
machines. Five aspects where described to showcase the possible uses of this
view.
In the SYSTEMS aspect, the human part of the machine provides cognitive
knowledge, processes and access to cognitive evaluation. These are used by the
computational part to build systems which can perform tasks and have abilities
which are similar or comparable to those of humans. This allows for comparative
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evaluation between the cognitive and computational counterparts. The systems
can also be used as tools for futher cognitive models.
In the TOOLS aspect, the computational systems previously constructed are
used to generate ample creativity and creative reasoning tasks. Such tasks are
evaluated by humans in comparison to classical datasets of those tasks, or via
other types of qualitative and quantitative assessment. The validated tasks can
be used to control for variables and allow for more complex empirical designs,
and thus provide more precise tools to explore human cognition with. Method-
ological and computational questions about what does it constitute a good cre-
ativity or creative reasoning task can lead to developments in the theoretical
and philosophical foundations of the concept of creativity.
In the PROCESSES & KR aspect, cognitive processes and cognitive types of
knowledge representation are used to inform the computational process and the
computational types of knowledge representation. This cognitive inspiration can
lead to new types of processes and knowledge representation, but also to more
cognitively friendly systems, which process and communicate information in a
way that is more similar to their users.
In the ASSISTANCE aspect, all the previous work is used to support and
train human creativity, creative reasoning and creative problem solving. To close
the loop, the assistive systems learns from the human creative activity, from
feedback or from human performance.
The METRICS aspect is used to optimize, evaluate and protect cognitive
social machine set-ups.
As future work, the authors intend to provide a more formal description of
(i) information flow, (ii) process and KR replication and inspiration and (iii)
cognitive social machine metrics. A set of case studies will also be observed in
depth through the lens of this approach, in all its five aspects.
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